Safety Focus
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  • CFSI(Counterfeit, Fraudulent, Suspect Item) Investigation
  • Historical background
  • In Nov. 2012, KHNP reported that sixty (60) CGD reports were counterfeited
    • NSSC formed the regulator-public joint investigation team to conduct complete enumeration investigations
    • Counterfeited test reports were discovered also in the certificates of nuclear grade items during the follow-up investigation.
  • The forgery investigation started in Jan. 2013 is still undergoing.
  • NSSC received forgery information through the tip-off channel
    • The EQ report of control cables supplied to Shin-Kori 1 & 2 and Shin-Wolsong 1 & 2 were falsified
    • Test results in the EQ reports were falsified by the EQ testing entity
  • Summary of Investigation
  • 6 reactors were related with the falsified EQ reports
    • 3 reactors (Shin-Kori 1&2 and Shin-Wolsong 1) in operation
    • 3 reactors (Shin-Kori 3&4 and Shin-Wolsong 2) under construction
    • NSSC decided the complete enumeration forgery investigation of domestically supplied items for all NPPs and all type of test reports including EQ reports
  Test report EQ report
Scope Past 10 years from 2003 through 2012 EQ reports issued since October 1996

Reports issued by the domestic or foreign testing entities among QVDs submitted by the domestic Suppliers

Reports issued by foreign testing entities among QVDs submitted by foreign Suppliers

Reports submitted by domestic suppliers and issued by domestic or oversea EQ entities

* Including non-safety grade items with Seismic Category I (based on FSAR)


Domestic: Site visits

Review test validity by checking the raw data

Oversea: Official letters, e-mail or site visits

Enquiry to the issuer or comparison with the original reports sent by EQ entities

  • Test Report Investigation
  • For domestic suppliers, investigation completed for all NPPs in operation or under construction.
Test Report Investigation
Category Number of
test reports
Falsified Unidentified
Reports of replaced parts for 23 reactors 21,681 247 (1.14%) 408
Reports of items for 3 recently commissioned reactors 104,606 944 (0.90%) 677
Reports of items for NPPs under construction (1 unit of OPR1000, 4 units of APR1400) 163,696 923(0.56%) 2,323
Total 289,983 2,114 3,408
Typical Route of Test Report Falsification

[Typical Route of Test Report Falsification]

  • EQ Report Investigation
  • For all items supplied by domestic manufacturers, the investigation of EQ test reports issued by domestic and foreign testing entities was completed. And currently, corrective actions such as re-test, re-analysis, and replacement are in-progress.
EQ Report Investigation
Objects Forged Unclear Objects Forged Unclear Objects Forged Unclear
20 reactors in operation 342 20 2 689 10 5 1,031 30 7
3 recently commissioned reactors & 5 new reactors 159 13 8 1,509 19 38 1,668 32 46
Total (Domestic) 501 33 10 2,198 29 43 2,699 62 53
Typical Route of EQ Report Falsification

[Typical Route of EQ Report Falsification]

  • Regulatory Position
  • For items supplied with falsified test reports, the installation status shall be identified, and the impact on safety shall be analyzed. Items identified to impact safety function of relevant SSCs shall be replaced. For items for which investigators could not verify genuine test reports, supplier should provide the evidence showing genuine, or the items shall be replaced or retested.
  • Corrective Action Status
  • Test Report
Test Report
Category Targets Replaced To be replaced Expected
completion date
Related reactors 22 units 13 units 9 units Mar.~ Nov., 2014
Items 553 508 45
Parts 7,705 7,261 404
  • EQ Report
EQ Report
Category Nonconforming
Forged Unclear Remarks
20 reactors in operation 37 30 7 Corrective actions such as retest, reanalysis, or replacement are in-progress
3 reactors recently commissioned 78 32 46
  • Regulatory Actions
    • To encourage anonymous report, “Nuclear Safety Ombudsman”
    • To strengthen the oversight of equipment testing entities
    • To introduce regulatory program for supply chain oversight
    • To strengthen the licensee QA program, “Forgery prevention”
    • To set up computerized configuration management system for all safety-related items
    • To set up a system, “Learning from the Failure”